INTRODUCTION
Ž . In a mediated talk see Lehrer, 1994 players are allowed to communicate through a mediator. Each one of them transmits a private message to the mediator. The latter, in turn, produces a public announcement which Ž . depends deterministically on the individual private messages. Players are allowed to communicate for a long time. After the conversation ends, each player takes an action relying on the private message as well as on the public announcement.
The motivation of this research is twofold. First, the mediated talk is a mechanism that can be designed to enable players to improve payoffs Ž . without violating incentive compatibility constraints. Lehrer 1994 shows Ž . that in a complete information game, unbounded without time limit mediated talk can generate any correlated equilibrium distribution Ž . Aumann, 1974 . Here we simplify the mechanism to cover the case of a one-shot communication phase and we generalize it to incomplete information games.
The second motivation is the examination of the extent to which existing mediating mechanisms can be correlation devices between players. Mediated talk exists everywhere. Any voting procedure involves private votes and public results; citizens cast their votes privately and the election results then become public. The public outcome is certainly a function of all private messages and it is therefore a mediated talk. When citizens, or committee members, take actions based on their own vote and on the publicly known outcome, their actions are necessarily correlated by the means of the mediated talk. Obviously, the primary use of an election is not as a mediating mechanism, but it has an inevitable consequence: it provides players with private and interrelated information.
The existing mediated talks are most often one-shot mechanisms. For instance, citizens or committee members cast their votes and the outcome is announced. This is also the case with tax returns which remain private and a resulting tax policy that becomes public. Thus, in order to examine the power of existing mediated talks, one should focus on one-shot mechanisms. Roughly speaking, what we show here is that, by one-shot mechanisms, everything can be generated. Therefore, we have gained no Ž extra predicting power had it been otherwise, namely, the case where some correlations are impossible, we would be able to predict that these . correlations cannot be induced.
We deal here with one-shot mediated talk and show that any correlated Ž . distribution with rational numbers probabilities can be produced in a way that is immunized against unilateral deviations. As an application, we show that by adding a mediated talk phase to any game, any correlated equilibrium distribution of this original game can be obtained as an equilibrium of the extension.
Another result, perhaps the most important one, is the application to Ž . communication equilibrium Forges, 1986 . In a communication extension Ž . of a game, each player sends some private message input to the mediator. Ž . In turn, the mediator chooses randomly private signals outputs , one for each player. Then the players take actions based on their own input and the private output they received. We show that every communication equilibrium distribution can be generated using a mediated talk. The mediated talk mechanism takes advantage of the initial private com-munication phase and enables the mediator to make only one public announcement rather than many private ones. Furthermore, the mediator's announcement is deterministic rather than random, as in a general communication device.
Ž . Finally, we introduce a universal mechanism. In Lehrer 1994 any correlated distribution requires its particular mechanism. Here, to the contrary, we introduce a universal mechanism that can be adapted to any specific correlated equilibrium.
The main idea of the construction of a mediated talk is to use a finite collection of jointly controlled lotteries. All of them but one remain latent. The active device is selected by the profile of private inputs. It produces some public output while none of the players is told which device is employed. Then, each individual uses his private input for decoding the public announcement.
CORRELATION DEVICE AND MEDIATED TALK
Ž . Ž . Inspired by Aumann 1974 Aumann , 1987 , we introduce a finite correlation Ž . device or information structure for n agents as a list of n random variables Y , i s 1, . . . , n, defined on the same probability space ⍀ and i ranged to finite output sets A , i s 1, . . . , n. One may think of the i probability space as the state space. If in ⍀ is the state, the information Ž . of agent i is Y . The knowledge of each agent i is represented by the i Ž . Ž finite partition generated by Y . The output of an agent e.g., a player in a i . game, computer component is a function of the information available to him. In simple words, one has the following: Ž .
for every a g A , every s g S , and x g X having positive probability yi yi i i under P , and every i s 1, . . . , n.
, Remark 1. Note that for any random variable with range S , and for
Therefore, any unilateral deviation does not affect the distribution over A Ž . given s , neither does it affect the distribution over A given s , x .
Ž . Ž . Moreover, by conditions 1 and 2 , both these distributions coincide with the corresponding distributions defined by Q. Now we are ready to state the first result of the paper. The payoff associated with this correlated equilibrium cannot be sustained by any Nash equilibrium nor by any combination of Nash equilibria. Thus, the players might want to resort to some external mediating device Ž . Ž that will generate the canonical correlation device Q see, e.g., Mertens Ž . . et al. 1994, Chap. II, Sect. 3 . They can do it by obeying the following Ä 4 procedure. Each player selects privately a number in 1, . . . , 4 with probability 1r4 each and then transmits it to a machine which produces a deterministic public announcement according to the matrix in Fig. 3 . The machine publicly announces x if players I and II selections were i, j, Ž . respectively, and if the i, j cell of the matrix is x, x s a, b. In other Ä 4 words, S s 1, . . . , 4 and assigns each symbol a probability of 1r4.
i i
After receiving the public announcement, the players play the strategies as shown in Figs. 4 and 5. One can check that if the players play the strategies just defined, then Q is indeed generated. Moreover, given these strategies and the uniform Ž . selection of player II, all the rows of the signaling matrix Fig. 3 are equivalent in the sense that all induce the same distribution over joint actions. The same observation holds for player II. Therefore, no player has any incentive to deviate either in the communication phase or in the play phase.
Ž . Ž . To see that this example satisfies 1 and 2 , note that, given and , 1 2 the conditional distribution, given any s , induced by and over A is
Q . Moreover, given s and x, the probability of any a is exactly Ž . Ž < . Ž<. x s c . Here, 1, c s t, Q l t s 2r3, and Q r t s 1r3. Indeed, given 1 s s 1 and x s c, the probability that player 2 will play l is 2r3, while the 1 probability of r being played is 1r3. EXAMPLE 2. In simulating Q we employed public mediation that used only two symbols, a and b. In order to generate the distribution QЈ s 1r31 3
Ž
.over the set of joint actions we must use three symbols. One way to 1r3 0 do it is to use the signaling matrix shown in Fig. 6 . Here each player chooses one of the numbers 1, 2, and 3 with equal probability. The strategies that induce QЈ are easy to construct.
THE MEDIATED TALK EXTENSION OF A GAME
Let G be an n-player game. We will extend the game G to a new game G* by adding a preplay communication phase. In this phase player i Ž . selects possibly randomly a message s from a finite set S . Then a 
G.
Private Selected Signal Public Announcement The Play Obviously, any profile of individual strategies in such an extension induces a correlated distribution in G. We are concerned here with the inverse questionᎏwhether any correlated equilibrium distribution of G can be generated by a Nash equilibrium of a mediated talk extension of G. We answer this question in the affirmative.
COROLLARY 1. Let C be a correlated equilibrium distribution of G with rational entries. Then there exists a mediated talk extension of G ha¨ing a Nash equilibrium that induces the distribution C.
Remark 2. The mechanism described here defines only Nash equilibrium of the extended game and not a strong equilibrium. Thus, it is immunized only against unilateral deviations.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We will first show the proof in the two player case. It extends easily to the n player case as indicated later. Suppose that the distribution Q over Ž . Acan be written as Q s c rd , where all c and d are
integers. The signaling matrix to be constructed is of the size dn = dm. Actually, it will be described as a n = m matrix where each cell is a d = d matrix. Let a , . . . , a be a string of y symbols. 
the latin square corresponding to the string
which consists of c times b and then c times b , and so forth. . In what fol-
Ž . Ž . lows, for any integers x and y, x n and y m will stand for the numbers x modulo n and y modulo m, respectively. Before we get to the announcement map defined by the signaling matrix we need one more convention.
Ž . When b is referred to as a string, rather than a matrix, the string is
defined in a natural way: the first row first, then the second row, and so forth. The signaling matrix consists of an n = m grand matrix where for every Ž . 0FkFny1 and 0 F l F m y 1 in the k, l cell, there stands the matrix 
Ž .
i ,j q 1 Ž 2 . can see that any symbol appears in any row and column only once or exactly three times. Moreover, if, for instance, x appears only once in a certain column, then it appears two more times in its row. An x that appears once in its column will later be associated with the right signal in A of player II. Since it appears only once player II knows what player I is 2 going to do; player I will play top because according to the distribution Q the probability of top given right is 1. Furthermore, when player I is prescribed to play top he should assign probability 2r3 on the left and 1r3 Ž . on the right these are the conditional probabilities , and therefore in the same row there appear two more x's which correspond to the left column. Now that S , S , and f are defined, in order to complete the description .Ž . Ž . l m s j. Therefore, the joint output i, j is prescribed c times out of a i j Ž . total of d. In other words, the joint output i, j is prescribed with Ž . probability c rd. Since this is true for any cell, i, j is assigned the i j Ž . Ž. probability c rd for any row namely, for any s . This shows 1 .
Ž . Next we show 2 . Namely, for every message s and public announce-1 Ž < . ment x, we show that the probability of a g A is Q a a , where . Therefore, given s , x , the probability The proof given is for the 2-player case. For the sake of completeness, we provide the adaptation needed for the n-player case. Let Q be a Ž . Ž . distribution over A, where Q a is rational for all a g A. Let Q a s Ž . Ž . a function b: 1, . . . , d ª A s.t. the number of l's s.t. b l s a is Ž . Ž . c a . We denote by b the projection of A to A . Thus, b l is an output of
As in the 2-player case, is uniform over S . As for , assume that the
Ž . public announcement is a , . . . , a , then the decoded signal of player i,
Proof of the Corollary. Let C be a correlated equilibrium distribution in G. Theorem 1 states that there exists a mediated talk mechanism which Ž Ž . . induces the distribution C over A this is a consequence of 1 . In order to show that this mediated talk mechanism defines a Nash equilibrium of the extension we show that no player can gain by adopting another mixed Ž . message or by adopting another decoding map , or both. By 2 , given i i Ž . and , for every s and x which satisfy s , x s a , one has
a is a best response against Q a a . Therefore, given , , and
, which prescribes a is a best response. By Remark 1, any alterna-
Ž . tive does not change properties 1 and 2 and therefore whatever the i alternative:
1. the probability of playing a is the one assigned by C for any a g A, and 2. whenever a is prescribed it is indeed an optimal response. i Ž . Ž . We have proved that , is a best response to , and
therefore it is a Nash equilibrium in the extended game G*. B Remark 3. In the construction of the signaling matrix we introduce the Ž . grand matrix which consists of the submatrices K и . The first components Ž . of the private messages sent by the players to the mediator select the Ž . Ž . specific K и that becomes active. The second components d and d 1 2
Ž . determine the public announcement from the K и already chosen.
One may consider all the submatrices K as jointly controlled devices. The active device is jointly chosen by the players through k and l. Then, the players jointly control the lottery using d and d , without knowing 1 2 which one is active.
Remark 4. In the proof we use decoding maps that do not depend i on the particular Q under consideration. As a matter of fact, the same decoding map is good for every Q.
FROM CORRELATED TO COMMUNICATION DEVICES
Ž . Forges 1986 introduced the concept of communication equilibrium. Before the mediator correlates between the players, he receives some information from them. For instance, in a game where players have Ž . differential information e.g., their own types , the correlation applied may Ž . depend on the data sent by the players. Thus the outcome may partially reveal their private information. EXAMPLE 4. Suppose that player I may be of two types, 1 and 2, which are equally likely. Player I knows his type while player II knows only the Ž . prior distribution over player I's type, 1r2, 1r2 . Let the payoffs be as shown in Fig. 7 .
Consider now the following mediation. If player I tells the mediator that Ž . Ž . he is of type 1, the mediator chooses one of the joint actions t, l , t, r , Ž . and b, l with probability 1r2, 1r4, and 1r4 respectively. However, if player I reports that he is of the second type, then the mediator chooses Ž . Ž . Ž . each of r, b , r, t , and l, b with probability 1r2, 1r4, and 1r4 respectively. Whatever the choice of the mediator, he informs player I of the row chosen and player II of the column chosen.
Note that, once player II receives some information from the mediator, his prior over player I's type changes. For instance, if l is sent, then the Ž . posterior ascribes type 1 the probability 3r4 as opposed to the prior 1r2 .
The distribution induced on any matrix is not a correlated equilibrium distribution. Nevertheless, due to differential information, given that players play according to the announcement of the mediator, the procedure induces an equilibrium; player I has the incentive to reveal his true type and to stick to the mediator's announcement and, moreover, player II also has no incentives to deviate. This conclusion depends strongly on the specific posteriors. Therefore, any simulating mechanism should always generate the same posteriors as the simulated device.
In order to generate this communication equilibrium by a mediated talk we adopt the matrix of Example 1 and define two signaling matrices, one for each type: matrix would have been of size 6 = 6. To have a dimension for player II independent of player I's type we replicate each matrix to get two matrices of size 24 = 24.
We introduce now the formal communication model and the corresponding extension of mediated talk. In a framework of incomplete information games, one possible interpre-Ž . tation is that T is the set of agent i's types. The profile t s t , . . . , t is 
is a message map from T to distributions on
As in Definition 2, the S are finite sets of messages and X is the finite 
Ž .
Proof. Let d be the common denominator for all Q t , t g T. We use the construction of Theorem 1 and adapt it to the private information setup. Two modifications are needed. First, in addition to the private signal chosen in Theorem 1, here each player privately sends a type. Thus, Myerson, 1991 , Sect. 6.3, or Mertens et al., 1994 .c states that Q is a canonical communication equilibrium. Namely, if the communication device Q is used in G, an equilibrium is obtained when each player sends his type to the mediator and plays in the game the action privately announced through Q. Proof. Given Q, we consider the mediated talk mechanism defined in Theorem 2. A potential deviation of player i in the mediated talk exten-Ž . Ž . sion of G is of the form t , b . By condition 4 above, the corresponding i i payoff for player i would be the same as the payoff he would get in G by Q Ž . using t , b . Since Q is a canonical communication equilibrium, there is i i Ž . no profitable deviation. Property 3 achieves the proof. B
FINAL COMMENTS
The fact that players can, by using independent randomizations, generate some correlated device and, moreover, do it in a way immunized against deviations dates back to 1968 when Aumann and Maschler intro-Ž duced the jointly controlled lottery see Maschler, 1995, and . Mertens et al., 1994, Section II.3, for extensions . In the framework of a finite game where the set of correlated or communication equilibrium distributions has finitely many extreme points, one can introduce a universal multistage mediated talk mechanism that can generate any equilibrium. This can be done by associating a mediated talk mechanism to each of the extreme points and adding a jointly controlled lottery. Any equilibrium induces a distribution over the extreme points. The jointly controlled lottery will be used sequentially to choose an extreme point according to this distribution and the selected mediated talk Ž mechanism will then be employed see Forges, 1990, and Mertens et al., . 1994 .
Recall that as soon as one deals with a mechanism that allows for private outputs at some stage, one can assume that all future outputs are public. In fact, these subsequent outputs can be encoded in several ways specific to each player by using some codes previously sent to him as Ž . private outputs see Forges, 1990, and Mertens et al., 1994 . The main contribution of this paper is to show that one can get rid of the private outputs in the case where players can send private inputs Ž . which is the basis of communication devices . Moreover, we provide an explicit construction taking care simultaneously of the randomness and of the private information aspects of correlated or communication devices.
